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Abstract 
Over the last 30 years the share of individuals in the Belgian working-age population without 
employment (‘individual joblessness’) has fallen continuously, while the share of households with no 
working-age member in employment (‘household joblessness’) remained fairly stable. In this paper 
we examine why individual joblessness and household joblessness diverge.  
 
The growing gap between both measures of joblessness reflects changes in household composition 
and changes in the distribution of individual employment over households. We describe the latter 
phenomenon by constructing a measure of ‘polarisation of employment over households’, which is 
based on the difference between observed and ‘expected’ household joblessness. On the basis of 
changes in household formation and changes in individual joblessness one would have expected 
household joblessness in Belgium to decrease. However, increasing polarisation, i.e. an increasingly 
unequal distribution of jobs over households, has counteracted this ‘expected’ evolution.  
 
Singles constitute households that are most vulnerable to the polarisation we describe, but a shift 
towards such more vulnerable households offers only a small share of the explanation of the 
evolution over time. We observe rising levels of polarisation, both in single adult households and 
couples. Within these household groups, changes in polarisation are similar, but increasing 
polarisation among couples is the most important factor in the overall increase in polarisation.  
 
The personal characteristics associated with individual joblessness (gender, education, age, region, 
origin) explain a significant part of this polarisation on the level of households. In 2012, almost half of 
polarisation in single adult households can be explained through typical individual characteristics of 
singles. In couples almost one third of polarisation is related to individual characteristics and marital 
selection. However, this also means that a substantial part of household joblessness cannot be 
explained by these individual characteristics. 
 
A comparison of Belgium with three low-polarisation countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands) 
and two high-polarisation countries (Ireland and the United Kingdom) suggests that polarisation is 
high in Belgium, when compared to Germany, France and the Netherlands, for the following reason. 
First, more than in those countries, Belgian singles have a weak socio-economic profile in terms of 
age, skills and origin: compared with the total population, they are more often low-skilled, older, and 
born outside the European Union. Second, the difference in individual joblessness between 
individuals with strong profiles and individuals with weak profiles is larger in Belgium than in those 
countries (whether it concerns singles or not). The latter factor is reinforced by regional differences 
within Belgium. Third, educational homogamy in couples is larger in Belgium than in Germany, 
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Employment can be measured on an individual level or on a household level. Employment rates are 
typically based on the proportion of working-age individuals who are in employment. These 
aggregate employment rates, based on individual data, may not fully capture the economic and 
social impact of joblessness. Exclusion of a person from the labour market not only affects him or her 
directly, but all the members of the household; it increases economic insecurity for the entire 
household. In countries with limited collective mechanisms to protect individuals against economic 
shocks (in particular new member states and Southern European countries), this household 
perspective is particularly important.  
 
At-risk-of-poverty rates and income inequality are typically measured at the level of the household. 
Hence, social policy analysis should also consider employment at the household level. The emphasis 
on household work intensity in the Europe 2020 strategy is based on this rationale. Europe 2020 has 
integrated the household dimension into the indicators on exclusion from the labour market1. 
However, research on the appropriate measure of joblessness at the household level remains 
limited. 
 
Corluy and Vandenbroucke (2013) discuss alternative concepts of household employment and the 
underlying definitions of employment and work intensity; the indicator of household joblessness we 
apply in this paper is but one instance of a class of indicators. Our focus in this paper is on the 
observation that individual-based and household-based measures of joblessness offer conflicting 
signals about labour market performance. In Belgium, individual joblessness fell continuously since 
the early 1980s while household joblessness remained fairly stable. Such an observation is not new 
and is not confined to Belgium. The discrepancy between individual and household joblessness has 
been documented comprehensively for a number of countries by Gregg and Wadsworth (2008, 
2012)2. However, understanding the relationship between individual and household joblessness is far 
from obvious. By exploring the Belgian data, this paper highlights caveats, difficulties and possible 
pitfalls in our understanding of the relationship between levels and patterns of individual and 





When constructing aggregate indices of economic well-being, Berloffa and Modena (2011) take into 
account the household dimension of (un)employed individuals. They propose a measure of 
household economic insecurity, the ‘inactive-unemployed dependency rate’, defined as the average 
number of inactive individuals in the household that depend on the employed ones. Similar 
unemployment rates can be associated with different levels of economic insecurity for the 
population, because demographic change and household formation processes affect the inactive-
unemployed dependency rate. Even if the unemployment rate does not change, economic insecurity 
can increase if the number of one-earner households or single parent households increases relative 
to other types of households. Marital instability can increase the vulnerability of households. 
                                                             
1 Indicators in the Europe 2020 strategy include both the share of persons (aged 18-59) who are living in jobless 
households (households where no working age member is at work) and the share of the population (aged 
below 60 years) living in households with a very low work intensity (households where the working age 
members work less than 20 percent of their total work potential). 
2 See also Gregg & Wadsworth (1996), OECD (1998), Dawkins, Gregg & Scutella (2002), Gregg & Wadsworth 





Gradin et al. (2014) also propose a framework for measuring employment deprivation among 
households. Their aggregate measure takes into account the incidence of household unemployment 
(how many households are touched by the lack of employment of any of its members), its intensity 
(how far are households on average from being employment non-deprived), and the inequality of 
employment exclusion across households (how concentrated is unemployment in households). Their 
aim is to ascertain the extent to which the incorporation of a household dimension changes profiles 
and trends in unemployment over countries. In general, Gradin et al. (2014) observe that the 
percentage of economically active individuals living in households affected by unemployment is large 
in countries where the unemployment rate is also large. In contrast, they observe larger employment 
deprivation intensity and inequality in countries with middle-range levels of unemployment, such as 
Germany and Belgium. Brandolini and Viviano (2013) also illustrate that the household dimension 
changes country profiles and trends in employment and unemployment. 
 
This household employment literature focuses on the construction of indicators of household 
employment and the relative ranking of countries; it does not explore the reasons for divergences 
between individual and household indicators. Gregg, Scutella and Wadsworth (2010, 2012) analyze 
the factors contributing to differences between individual and household measures: household 
formation and the distribution of employment over households. In order to describe the distribution 
of employment over households, they construct an indicator of ‘polarisation’. Increasing polarisation, 
mainly observable in two-adult households, is the most important factor explaining the divergence 
between individual and household joblessness in five countries up to the mid-2000s.  
 
Meanwhile, researchers interested in poverty started to examine the link between the poverty 
records of welfare states and household employment rates that characterize welfare states. Shifting 
attention from individual to household employment is a natural move in poverty research. We 
measure income poverty on a household basis, hence, the rather weak correlation that is often 
observed between individual employment rates and poverty rates across mature welfare states 
should, prima facie, not come as a surprise. However, the solid association identified between higher 
household employment and a lower at-risk-of-poverty at the micro-level of households is much 
weaker at the macro-level3. 
  
                                                             
3 Paul de Beer (2007) analyzes the failure of the Lisbon Strategy with regard to its poverty goal on the basis of 
the relationship between poverty and household joblessness, contrasting long-term changes in individual 
joblessness and household joblessness. The OECD Employment Outlook 2001 (2001, 59-61) pointed to the 
absence of significant correlations between aggregate employment and unemployment rates on one hand and 
poverty measures on the other hand. This OECD finding is cited in Gregg and Wadsworth (2008) and may have 
inspired different authors, such as Dickens and Ellwood (2002), Nickell (2004), and de Graaf-Zijl & Nolan (2012) 
to focus on household joblessness in analyses of poverty. The analyses of poverty trends during the ‘good 
economic years’ collected in the 2000s in the volume by Cantillon and Vandenbroucke (2014) also emphasize 
the discrepancy between individual joblessness and household joblessness. As explained in Cantillon and 
Vandenbroucke (2014, see note 6 p. 54, and Table 3.3 p. 113), with regard to the correlation between 
individual employment rates, household employment rates and poverty, our results contradict the findings by 
the OECD; however, the latter relate to a different sample of countries (ECHP countries and Canada and the 
USA), a different database (ECHP) and a different time than the correlations we obtain on the basis of SILC for 
European welfare states in the 2000s. For a recent examination of the link between household employment 
patterns and child poverty on a cross-country basis, see Vandenbroucke, Diris and Verbist (2013). For a 
decomposition of cross-country differences in child poverty and inter-temporal changes, with a focus on 
Belgium, see Vandenbroucke and Vinck (2013).  
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3. Purpose and structure of the paper 
 
All household employment measures show rising inequality in the distribution of employment at the 
household level. Moreover, Gradin et al. (2014) show that country rankings change substantially if 
only the most severe household employment deprivation is examined, i.e. household joblessness 
(even a very limited job was not available to members of the household). In fact, of all EU24 
countries under review, Belgium registers the highest levels of employment deprivation inequality 
among deprived households, indicating that the burden of joblessness is strongly concentrated in 
certain households, while individual unemployment rates rank along the EU24 average.  
 
We will use the concept of polarisation as constructed by Gregg, Scutella and Wadsworth (2010, 
2012) to quantify the sources of divergence between individual and household joblessness. By 
elaborating upon it, we will highlight caveats, difficulties and possible pitfalls in our understanding of 
the relationship between individual and household employment.  
 
A first caveat concerns the interpretation of what we observe. We see that individual joblessness has 
decreased considerably in Belgium, in percentage points, since 1983. In contrast, household 
joblessness remained more or less stable, but the share of individuals in ‘full-employment 
households’ (households where all adult members are in employment) increased spectacularly, from 
40% to 65% of the Belgian population. Now, the spectacular increase in the share of individuals in 
‘full-employment households’ is, first of all, the mathematical corollary of the substantial rise in 
individual employment rates: it is what one would expect if (a growing number of) jobs would have 
been distributed randomly across Belgian households4. The relevant question is about the portion of 
the discrepancy between the evolution of household employment and individual employment that 
cannot be explained by the mathematics of random distributions, i.e. the part of the observed 
discrepancy that calls for demographic, economic, sociological and cultural explanations, which may 
be region- or country-specific. This first caveat underscores the relevance of a polarisation concept, 
such as the one proposed by Gregg and his co-authors, as it can be used to quantify the differences 
between observed and expected household joblessness and allows for further decomposition over 
household subgroups and individual characteristics that drive joblessness. A second caveat concerns 
the different realities behind the notion of ‘household joblessness’; the social realities behind 
household joblessness are rather different in the three Belgian regions.  
 
The polarisation index is based on a counterfactual (or ‘expected’) household joblessness rate, i.e. 
the rate that would occur if jobs were randomly distributed over the population, given the specific 
household size structure in the country under examination. Polarisation is defined as the difference 
between the actual and the expected household joblessness rate: it measures the extent to which 
there are more (or fewer) jobless households than expected in the case of a random distribution of 
employment across individuals, given the national household size structure. This technique allows for 
two refinements. First, the overall polarisation of jobs over households can be decomposed on the 
basis of household size subgroups in the population. It appears that polarisation is much higher in 
households with only one working-age adult, and that cross-country differences in polarisation (as 
observed in 2012) are driven to a large extent by different shares of the population being part of 
single-adult households. This observation highlights a conceptual caveat – and possibly a pitfall – in 
understanding ‘polarisation’. What we label ‘polarisation’ in this analysis is driven, in part, by the 
                                                             
4 In other words, the decline in the parameter α (a ratio of a household employment indicator on an individual 
employment indicator) that drives the analysis of disappointing poverty trends by Paul de Beer (2007) is, in 
part, a mathematical truism. The evolution of the parameter α is a black box that contains both what one may 
expect on the basis of the mathematics of random distribution and what is to be explained by economic, 
sociological and cultural shifts in European labour markets and societies.  
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well-known fact that singles and lone parents are typically less employed than other adults. Second, 
the construction of the polarisation index can be refined by taking into account observable traits of 
individuals that influence both individual unemployment risks and household formation, such as 
gender, age, education and the region where they live. Gregg and his co-authors use these 
observable traits to calculate ‘conditional polarisation’.  
 
A complexity that emerges in this paper is that the analysis of inter-temporal change in polarisation 
and the analysis of cross-country differences in levels of polarisation yields different emphases: 
whilst today’s cross-country differences in polarisation levels are driven to a large extent by cross-
country differences in the share of individuals in single-adult households, the increase in polarisation 
in Belgium since 1983 is mainly driven by the increasing level of polarisation in couples. The paper 
first concentrates on inter-temporal changes and interregional differences within Belgium. 
Subsequently, cross-country differences are shown and decomposed on the basis of household size. 
By comparing household joblessness in countries with similar household size structures we explore 
the reasons for the relatively bad position of Belgium.  
 
Finally, but importantly, the relationship between poverty and household employment rates is 
complex5. The binary distinction between ‘jobless’ and ‘non-jobless’ households is probably too 
crude to be very meaningful in poverty analysis. However, in the last section of this paper we show 
that our polarisation index correlates strongly with a ‘relative severity of work poverty’ measure, 
which is based on actual observations of (continuous) work intensity. The correlations we establish 
between these fine-grained household employment indicators and the more crude measures of 
individual joblessness and household joblessness, underscore the relevance of the polarisation 
analysis for poverty research, but also the circumspection with which it should be applied. 
  
We wrap up the analysis in a concluding section, and point out questions for further research.  
 
 
4. Data and definitions 
 
The Belgian Labour Force Survey has been conducted by the Belgian Bureau of Statistics6 since 1983. 
It contains detailed information on household composition and labour market position. Around 
55,000 working age individuals are surveyed yearly.  
 
Throughout this paper we will use ‘adult’ as a short cut for working-age adults. ‘Working age’ refers 
to the age bracket 20-59, excluding full-time students and those adults living in a household of which 
the reference person is older than 59. By excluding students and the elderly, we try to minimize the 
effects of educational participation and retirement on the adults’ decision of participating in the 
labour force7. At the household level, we cluster households by the number of adults present in the 
household. Doing so, we distribute all individuals over three relevant household sizes, i.e. single-
adult households, couples and those households with at least three working-age adults.  
 
                                                             
5 See footnote 3 for literature exploring this relationship. 
6 ADSEI: Algemene Directie Statistiek en Economische Informatie 
7 We exclude full-time students both when we count the members of the household who are in employment 
(to classify the household as ‘jobless’ or ‘not jobless’), and when we define the population for which we 
calculate the household joblessness. Because detailed information on the educational participation of 
respondents is lacking in the early Belgian survey we consider respondents as ‘full-time students’ when they 
are between 20 and 24 years old and their ILO status is ‘inactive’. 
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We use an ILO concept of employment. According to this concept, an individual is in employment if 
he or she was employed for at least one hour in the reference week of the survey. The household is 
jobless if no member in the age bracket 20-59 (excluding full-time students and households of which 
the reference person is older than 59) is in employment, so defined. We are primarily interested in 
the population share that is not in any employment. Adults in a jobless household can be either ILO 
unemployed or inactive in the labour force. As a short cut, we will use ‘household joblessness (rate)’ 
to refer to the share of adults (excluding the same categories) living in jobless households. ‘Individual 
joblessness’ refers to the proportion of individual adults who are not in employment. The 
denominator in both indicators is the number of adults, so defined.  
 
The concept of employment that we use in this paper is rather elementary. We do not impose any 
scale of employment intensity, for example part-time versus full-time, nor effective hours and 
months that have been achieved within an entire calendar year. Over the last decade, different 
concepts of household employment have emerged, each with different demarcations of the relevant 
populations and different definitions of employment; these differences have an impact on the 
ranking of countries by their population in household joblessness8. On the other hand, a binary 
employment definition offers great advantages for decomposing trends in household joblessness 
over time, for comparison of countries and regions, and for the construction and evaluation of a 
polarisation index.  
 
In the last section of this paper, we discuss the link between household employment rates and 
poverty, and show to what extent different indicators of household employment correlate with each 
other. We compare ILO-based indicators (household joblessness, the polarisation index) and the fine-
grained indicators that are based on work intensity with EU-SILC data (survey year 2011).  
  
 
5. Trends in individual employment and household employment in Belgium 
 
Individual-based and household-based measures of joblessness offer conflicting signals about labour 
market performance. Figure 1 documents the evolution of the Belgian labour market, using both an 
individual and a household perspective.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The observed evolution is shown in the solid lines in Figure 1. In 2012, individual joblessness was 11.4 
percentage points lower than in 1983. On the contrary, household joblessness was 1.5 percentage 
points higher. The share of adults in ‘full-employment households’ (households where all adults are 
in employment) increased by 25.1 percentage points (to 65.4 percent in 2012), while the share of 
adults in ‘mixed-employment households’ (with a mixture of working and non-working adults) 
decreased by 26.5 percentage points. In other words, ‘full-employment households’ replaced ‘mixed-
employment households and household joblessness remained stable. If we rank adults on the basis 
of the employment situation of their household, in 1983 the median adult belongs to a ‘mixed-
employment household’; from 1991 onwards, the median adult belongs to a ‘full-employment 
household’. These figures illustrate the rapid change from a male breadwinner model to a dual 
earner welfare model. 
 
                                                             
8 Corluy and Vandenbroucke (2013) explore alternative definitions of household employment in section 3.1 and 




Next to the observed evolution in the employment pattern, shown with the solid lines, the dotted 
lines in Figure 1 present a counterfactual household employment pattern, which one would have 
‘expected’ if jobs were randomly distributed over households. The dotted red line is the expected 
share of adults in full-employment households, if jobs were randomly distributed over households; 
the dotted yellow line is the expected share of adults in mixed-employment households, under the 
same hypothesis; the dotted green line is the expected household joblessness, in the same 
counterfactual vein. Consider the following simple example to understand the nature of these 
counterfactuals: a population of working-age adults is organized in couples of two adults and singles; 
a fraction δ of the adults are jobless, i.e. the individual risk to be jobless is equal to δ. If the 
distribution of jobs over households is random, we would expect a fraction δ of the singles to be 
jobless and a (smaller) fraction δ2 of the couples to be jobless; conversely, we would expect a fraction 
1-δ of the singles and a fraction (1-δ)2 of the couples to constitute full-employment households; 
finally, a fraction (2δ-2δ2) of the couples would constitute mixed-employment households. On this 
basis, we can calculate a counterfactual share of adults in full-employment households, a 
counterfactual share of adults in mixed-employment households and a counterfactual share of adults 
in jobless households. The example highlights the following counterfactual expectations. First, with a 
random distribution of jobs, joblessness will be less prevalent in larger households: larger households 
allow more risk pooling (with regard to the risk of being a jobless individual) than smaller households. 
Second, when δ is smaller than 0.50, the share of individuals in mixed-employment households 
decreases when δ decreases, i.e. the prevalence of mixed employment households decreases when 
the individual employment rate increases, for a given (frozen) household size structure. In the same 
vein, we can show that, for any value of δ, the ‘expected’ ratio of the share of adults in full-
employment households to the share of individual adults in employment will increase when 
individual joblessness decreases. Simultaneously, the ‘expected’ ratio of household joblessness to 
individual joblessness will decrease when individual joblessness decreases. 
 
The dotted lines in Figure 1 are counterfactuals based on the actual household size structure in 
Belgium, as it evolved from 1983 to 2012; i.e. the household structure is not frozen, as in the 
theoretical example in the previous paragraph. Given the evolving household size structure, the 
expected share of adults in full-employment households (the dotted red line) would have increased 
by 19.1 percentage points; that is less than the observed increase of 25.1 percentage points, but still 
a considerable increase. The expected share of adults in mixed-employment households (the dotted 
yellow line) would have decreased by 15.4 percentage points, an important decline but considerably 
less than what we observed. The expected household joblessness would have diminished by 3.7 
percentage points, instead of slightly increasing. In other words, a part of the actual evolution we see 
in the solid lines in Figure 1 is what we would expect, purely on the basis of the mathematics of 
random distributions and the concomitant risk pooling in households that contain more than one 
adult. For instance, the spectacular increase in the share of adults in full-employment households 
and the decrease of the share in mixed-employment households are, at least partly, a mathematical 
corollary of the substantial rise in individual employment rates. However, comparing the solid and 
the dotted lines in Figure 1 also explains that the share of adults in full-employment households has 
grown even faster than expected, and that the standstill in household joblessness could have been a 
substantial decrease given a random distribution of jobs. Hence, from the point of view of social 
research and policy, there are two interesting questions. First, what was the impact of changes in 
household size structure (e.g. the increasing share of singles) on the dotted (expected) lines? Second, 
how can we explain the discrepancy between the solid (observed) and the dotted (expected) lines?  
 
Figure 2 repeats the same analysis for the three Belgian regions, but with a specific focus on 
household joblessness. This figure underscores the substantial regional disparities in labour markets.  
 




In 2012, individual joblessness rates ranged from 33.4 percent in Brussels (a short cut for the Brussels 
Capital Region) to 27.4 percent in Wallonia to 17.4 percent in Flanders. Looking at changes over time, 
it is remarkable that in Brussels, individual joblessness rates have not altered over time (one should 
not forget however that the population of Brussels increased rapidly). In contrast, in both Flanders 
and Wallonia, individual joblessness rates have substantially decreased, although less so in Wallonia 
(a 9.5 percentage point decrease compared with a 14.8 decrease in Flanders). Regional individual 
joblessness rates were very similar in the early 1980s, but diverged in the next 30 years. This 
divergence in individual employment participation is also reflected at the household level. Household 
joblessness is 20.1 percent in Brussels, 16.0 percent in Wallonia and 7.5 percent in Flanders. 
Household joblessness increased in Brussels and Wallonia with 7.8 and 2.4 percentage points; in 
Flanders it dropped from 7.8 to 7.5 percent. While the evolution at the bottom of the household 
employment distribution was disappointing, the share of adults in full-employment households 
increased considerably in Flanders and Wallonia. Just as for Belgium, a meaningful interpretation of 
these regional trends is only possible through a comparison with the ‘expected’ household 
employment. 
  
In 2012, the observed household joblessness was in all regions higher than the expected household 
joblessness: the gap ranges from 2.5 and 2.7 percentage points in Flanders and Brussels respectively 
to 4.4 percentage points in Wallonia. However, when we look at trends over time, the evolution of 
this gap is very similar in Flanders and Wallonia: with respective increases of 5.2 and 4.7 percentage 
points. The growth in this gap between observed and expected household joblessness is more 
limited in Brussels, with a 3.0 percentage point increase. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Ceteris paribus, the probability of having no adult in employment is higher in a smaller household 
than in a larger one; the risk of household joblessness decreases with household size. If the share of 
individuals in smaller households increases, we expect a given rate of individual joblessness to lead 
to higher household joblessness, all other things being equal. Hence, in this counterfactual approach, 
the ‘expected rate’ of household joblessness is a function of both individual joblessness and the size 
structure of households.  
 
[Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here] 
 
Over the last three decades, an important demographic trend occurred. Figure 4 shows that the 
proportion of single-adult households has more than doubled; the share of individuals living in 
couples and bigger households decreased by, respectively, 8.8 and 3.9 percentage points.  
 
This trend emerges in every Belgian region, although at a different pace (see Figure 5). In 2012, the 
Brussels region has the highest share of adults in single-adult households (33.4 percent), followed by 
Wallonia (24.7 percent), which in turn has a much larger share of individuals in single-adult 
households than Flanders (16.7 percent). In all regions, the median household type (by number of 
adults) remains a couple of two adults, but with shares diverging  from 67.3 percent in Flanders to 
61.3 percent in Wallonia and 53.2 percent in Brussels.  
 
 
6. Realities behind non-employment 
 
The share of the working-age population that lives in a jobless household did not decrease over a 
period of 30 years. This image of general stability, however, hides opposite evolutions within regions. 
On the one hand, since 1987, household joblessness decreased sharply for individuals over 50 (see 
Figure 6). On the other hand, household joblessness in age categories younger than 50 did not 
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decrease at all. Household joblessness and its evolution within age groups differ by region, especially 
in the age cohort that typically has dependent children. For individuals over 50 household 
joblessness gradually decreases in each region, with 14 percentage points in Wallonia as well as in 
Flanders. In Flanders, household joblessness in the age group 20 to 40 is relatively low and stable at 
around 5 per cent over the entire period. In contrast, household joblessness in Wallonia (and also 
Brussels) is persistent and much higher. Moreover, it increases in these regions. 
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
The sociological phenomenon by which a large group of individuals over 50 are unemployed has 
changed considerably over the past thirty years. At the beginning of the 1980s, almost 60 per cent of 
the working-age population lived in a couple where the man was employed and the woman wasn’t. 
During the period of the great industrial restructuring (between 1981 and 1987) a sizeable group of 
older men lost their jobs9. Due to the fact that they were the sole earner within their household, the 
share of jobless households suddenly increased with 10 percentage points. In a male breadwinner 
model, with many men but very few women in employment, an economic downturn has an 
immediate and strong effect on household joblessness. Gauged from the perspective of household 
joblessness, it took 25 years to digest this wave of male exits from the labour market. In that period, 
more and more women participated in the labour market and they also stayed longer in the jobs 
they held.  
 
Figure 7 shows that the age structure of adults in jobless households differs between the regions. 
Flanders has a relatively large share of its population in jobless households in the age bracket 50-59 
when compared to Wallonia and especially compared to Brussels. This suggests that, in explaining 
polarisation, early exit from the labour market plays a much larger role in Flanders than in the other 
regions, the presumption being that elderly workers who exit the labour market via pre-retirement 
typically do so in circumstances where their partner is inactive or has become inactive as well.  
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
A corollary of the regional age distribution of adults in jobless households is that adults in age 
cohorts that typically have dependent children are more affected by household joblessness in 
Wallonia and Brussels than in Flanders. In Figure 8, we show that, by 2012, considerably more adults 
with dependent children live in jobless households in Brussels and Wallonia than in Flanders. In 
Brussels, half of all adults in jobless households have at least one dependent child. In Flanders, the 
proportion of adults in jobless households with children is one in three. 
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
Over a period of 30 years, the proportion of adults in jobless households that have children has 
significantly decreased in the Flemish region. Both among jobless singles and jobless couples, the 
share of children has decreased, although among jobless couples this trend reverses during the 
economic crisis. In Wallonia, the proportion of adults in a jobless household that have dependent 
children remains more or less the same over the entire period, both for those living alone or in 
couples. The precarious position of children is most pronounced in the Brussels region. In this region, 
the share of adults in jobless couples that house children is substantially higher than in other regions 
(around 70 percent of adults in jobless couples live with at least one child). These findings 
                                                             
9 Between 1983 (the start of the LFS data series) and 1987 individual unemployment among men between 50 




corroborate with the interregional difference associated with household employment patterns of 
households with children, as emphasized by Vandenbroucke and Vinck (2013). In their analysis of the 
relation between household employment patterns and child poverty in Belgium, they find that 
children in ‘severe work poverty’ (an indicator characterizing the labour market participation of 
households with children, which correlates with household joblessness, see below) is much more 
prevalent in Wallonia than in Flanders.  
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
And also the educational profile of people living in jobless households offers an example of regional 
disparity. In each region, at least half of all adults living in jobless households (in 2012) have no 
diploma in secondary education. In Brussels, the educational profile of adults in household 
joblessness has hardly changed over time. Its jobless households host 50 percent without secondary 
education and a relatively high share (around 20 percent) of tertiary educated adults. In Flanders and 
Wallonia, the changes in the educational background of adults in household joblessness have 
changed rapidly over time, with gradually less medium and  high-skilled individuals.  
 
[Figure 10 about here] 
 
The different socio-demographic characteristics of adults in household joblessness in Brussels are (at 
least partly) associated with their origin. Over the last decade, the proportion of the non-EU15 born 
population has doubled in Belgium. This evolution is even more pronounced in the working age 
population. As shown in Figure 10, this demographic change was (initially) most pronounced in the 
capital region. In 2012, more than 50 percent of adults in jobless households are non-EU15 born in 
Brussels. In that year, the proportion of foreign-born adults in jobless households is much smaller in 
Flanders and Wallonia, with respectively 27.2 and 26.2 percent non-native born adults. However, the 
change over the last 18 years in the proportions of non-EU born adults in jobless households is much 
stronger in Flanders and Wallonia compared to Brussels10.  
 
 
7. The concept of polarisation 
 
Gregg and Wadsworth (2008) propose to use the counterfactual random distribution of jobs over 
households, introduced in the previous section, to define ‘polarisation’ in job distribution. 
Polarisation is the difference between the observed household joblessness and the counterfactual 
(or ‘expected’) household joblessness: it is the gap between the solid and the dotted lines for 
household joblessness presented in Figure 1 and 2. Thus, polarisation measures the extent to which 
there are more (or fewer) jobless households than expected under the hypothesis of a random 
distribution of jobs over households, given the national household size structure. The construction 
and subsequent decomposition of this polarisation index is made possible by the rather crude 
distinction between jobless households and other households, based on the ILO employment 
concept; a similar comparison of ‘observed’ with ‘counterfactual’ employment patterns would be 
much more difficult with fine-grained measures of household work-intensity. Formally, this can be 
written:  
                                                             
10 Corluy & Verbist (2015) explore the divergent household work intensity between households with foreign-
born working age adults versus those households with only native adults. It appears that the average 
household work intensity of non-European adults is lower than that of natives, mainly because of precarious 
individual employment rates of immigrants in Belgium. But despite (very) low individual employment rates, 
mainly of female immigrants, the current distribution of jobs over households follows a more traditional 




(1)    𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑗𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑗𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑒  
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡  = level of polarisation in household joblessness in country i in year t  
𝑗𝑙𝑖𝑡  = actual share of individuals living in household joblessness 
𝑗𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑒   = expected share of individuals living in household joblessness in country i in year t 
 
We should emphasize that the expression ‘polarisation’ does not carry a normative meaning for us. 
We do not consider the benchmark used to define the concept – a random distribution of jobs over 
households, given the household size structure – as a normative ideal. In a context of limited job 
opportunities ‘positive polarisation’ might be seen as a kind of ‘Matthew effect’: a concentration of 
additional advantage (say, a second job for the partner of someone who is already employed) for 
those who already have some advantage (compared with a household where both partners are 
jobless); ‘negative polarisation’ might be appreciated as a form of solidarity, i.e. a fair distribution of 
scarce employment opportunities. However, we do not suggest that maximally ‘negative 
polarisation’, nor the benchmark of ‘randomly distributed jobs’, serves a normative ideal. The 
negative polarisation that was typical for the male breadwinner model was neither a sustainable nor 
a desirable model. Our argument is rather that ‘positive polarisation’ comes with a social cost: 
jobless households of working-age people need to be supported by social transfers. If that cost is to 
some extent avoidable, the welfare state is in a sense in a suboptimal equilibrium. 
 
[Figure 11 about here] 
 
Figure 11 shows polarisation levels by household size. Over the whole period under review, both 
observed and expected household joblessness are higher in single-adult households than in other 
households. Despite substantial decreases in observed household joblessness among singles, the 
decline in expected household joblessness takes place at a far higher pace. This results in growing 
levels of polarisation within this particular household subgroup over a period of 30 years. In 
comparison with a rather limited level of polarisation (around 2 percentage points) in 1983, singles in 
Belgium are currently confronted with a polarisation level of 10.3 percentage points. The evolution in 
the subgroup of couples is rather similar: the observed household joblessness also diminishes, but 
the decrease in expected household joblessness is much stronger. During the 1980s the observed 
household joblessness for couples was lower than what could be expected on the basis of a random 
distribution of jobs: the male breadwinner model implied -by definition- negative polarisation. In 
1983, levels of polarisation in couples were around -2.7 percentage points. Since the early 1990s the 
relationship between observation and expectation in the couple segment has changed: the level of 
polarisation first approached zero, and then became positive starting in the mid-nineties. The 
breadwinner model and negative polarisation of employment in the 1980s is consistent with added 
worker theories (see Cullen and Gruber, 2000). These theories suggest that the presence of an 
employed adult in a household with two working age people would reduce the labour supply of other 
occupants. Indeed, in that period female employment rates lagged significantly behind those of men. 
However, over a period of 30 years the gender gap in individual employment rates has significantly 
decreased, from 38.4 percentage points in 1983 to 10.0 percentage points in 2012. In 2012 the level 
of polarisation in couples equals 1.7 percentage points. Over the last three decades, levels of 
polarisation increased by 4.5 percentage points.  
 
The polarisation analysis can be decomposed on the basis of household size. The overall level of 
polarisation is a weighted average of polarisation within each household size subgroup. The 
combined effect of increasing polarisation in both the single-adult household segment and in the 
couple segment resulted in an increase in the overall Belgian polarisation level from -1.6 in 1983 to 
3.5 in 2012. Given that there are around 5,900,000 working age individuals in Belgium in 2012, our 
estimates suggest that there are currently around 206,500 extra individuals in jobless households, 
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compared to what would be expected if employment were distributed at random over households.  
 
[Figure 12 about here] 
 
Figure 12 repeats the same analysis of expected and observed household joblessness by household 
size for the three regions. Strong regional variation prevails in the levels of and changes in 
polarisation. In Brussels, levels of polarisation in single-adult households are relatively small. Levels 
of polarisation in single-adult households are much more pronounced in the two other regions, with 
very high levels in Wallonia (14.3 percentage points in 2012), which are more than double the level 
of polarisation in Flanders (6.1 percentage points) and more than three times the level polarisation in 
Brussels (3.9). Changes in polarisation in this household segment are also most outspoken in 
Wallonia with an 8.9 percentage point increase, as compared with respectively 6.2 and 1.9 
percentage point increases in Flanders and Brussels. In 2012, levels of polarisation in couples are 
twice as high in Brussels and Flanders compared to Wallonia. In every region there is a trend towards 
higher polarisation in the subgroup of couples. This change was strongest in Flanders with a 5.5 
percentage point increase in 30 years (compared to a 2.5 percentage point increase in Wallonia). 
Finally, levels of polarisation in households with more than two adults are highest in Brussels, 
followed by Wallonia and Flanders. Changes in polarisation in this household segment were strongest 
in Brussels and Flanders. 
 
In the previous paragraphs we have presented household size structure (the distribution of adults by 
household size) and polarisation levels by household size separately. Polarisation by household size 
and the household size structure together explain the overall level of polarisation: we integrate them 
in Figure 13 and Figure 14. 
 
[Figure 13 and Figure 14 about here] 
 
Figures 9 and 10 display levels of polarisation for Belgium and its regions and show the weighted 
contribution of polarisation levels by household size (weighted by the household size structure). In 
2012, 68 percent of national polarisation is due to the weighted contribution of polarisation in single-
adult households, while the weighted contribution of polarisation in two-adult households is only 31 
percent.  
 
At the regional level, Flanders and Brussels are confronted with similar levels of polarisation, and 
despite different household size structures and within-household size levels of polarisation, the 
weighted contribution of polarisation by household size ends up rather similar. Around 45 percent of 
total polarisation stems from polarisation in single-adult households, weighted by their proportion in 
the population. The weighted contribution of polarisation in two and three-adult households 
constitutes respectively 45 and 10 percent of total polarisation. The decomposition of total 
polarisation is rather different in Wallonia. The relatively high level of polarisation in single adult 
households (and a substantial proportion of adults living in single-adult households) results in an 81 
percent contribution to total polarisation. In strong contrast with Flanders and Brussels, merely 14 
percent of total polarisation is due to the weighted contribution of polarisation in couples.  
 
 
8. Decomposition of changes in household joblessness and polarisation 
 
Observed household joblessness in one country or region at a certain point in time consists of two 
terms. One is the expected household joblessness (a random distribution of individual non-
employment over households) and the other is the level of polarisation (the share of household 
joblessness that one cannot explain through random distribution of individual joblessness). When we 
evaluate changes in household joblessness over time, changes can stem from both terms, i.e. 
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changes in expected household joblessness and changes in levels of polarisation.  
 
The expected household joblessness can evolve because individual joblessness changes over time. 
But, the expected household joblessness can also change because the household size structure of a 
population changes. The overall level of polarisation can change because of changes in the level of 
polarisation in one or more of the household subgroups we distinguish. We refer to this type of 
change as ‘within-household change’. The overall level of polarisation can however also change due 
to changes in the household size structure; for instance, overall polarisation may increase because 
the share of adults in a household subgroup where polarisation is relatively higher increases, without 
any change in the polarisation of that subgroup itself. We refer to this second type of change as 
‘between-household change’.  
 
Hence, changes in overall household joblessness can be decomposed into four terms: (i) the 
contribution by changes in individual joblessness that affect the expected rate of household 
joblessness (for a given household size structure); (ii) the contribution by changes in the household 
size structure that affect the expected rate of household joblessness; (iii) the contribution by 
between-household changes, i.e. changes in household structure that impact the degree of 
polarisation, given subgroup polarisation levels; and (iv) the contribution by within-household 
polarisation changes, i.e. changes in subgroup polarisation levels.  
 
(2)  ∆ 𝑗𝑙𝑖 =  ∑ ∆𝑛
𝑘[0.5ᴨ𝑘,𝑡 + 𝑂. 5ᴨ𝑘,𝑡+1]
𝐾
𝑘=1    (i)  + 
   ∑ ∆ᴨ𝑘[0.5𝑛𝑡
𝑘 + 0.5𝑛𝑡+1
𝑘 ]𝐾𝑘=1     (ii) + 
   ∑ ∆ᴨ𝑘 [0.5(𝑗𝑙𝑘 − 𝑛
𝑘)
𝑡
+ 0.5(𝑗𝑙𝑘 − 𝑛
𝑘)
𝑡+1
]𝐾𝑘=1  (iii) +  
   ∑ ∆(𝑗𝑙𝑘 − 𝑛
𝑘)[0.5ᴨ𝑘,𝑡 + 0.5ᴨ𝑘,𝑡+1]
𝐾
𝑘=1    (iv) 
 
with 
n = individual non-employment rate of working-age adults 
k = household size (number of working age adults) 
K = maximal size of households in a country 
ᴨ𝑘   = share of working-age adults living in a household of size k 
𝑗𝑙𝑘  = observed household joblessness rate of working-age adults in households of size k  
 
Figure 15 presents such a decomposition of changes in household joblessness over the period of 
1983-2012, both at the national level and at the regional level.  
 
[Figure 15 about here] 
 
We first focus on the national level. As shown in Figure 1 individual employment in Belgium 
increased by 11.4 percentage points between 1983 and 2012; if today’s household size structure 
would be the same as in 1983 and no changes in polarisation would have occurred, household 
joblessness would be 6.4 percentage points lower; this is shown in Figure 15 by means of the light 
blue bar (contribution by changes in individual joblessness). However, the shift towards more single-
adult households counteracts the impact of decreasing individual joblessness: it reduces the 
expected decrease in household joblessness from 6.4 percentage points to around 3.7 percentage 
points (see the dark blue bar in Figure 15, contribution by changes in the household size structure). 
Additionally, changes in polarisation occurred over time, due to both ‘change within’ and ‘change 
between’: polarisation increased in all household subgroups and the household size structure shifted 
towards households with a higher polarisation level. The combined effect of what could be expected, 
taking into account shifts in the household size structure, and the increase in polarisation (due to 
both ‘within’ and ‘between’ change), is a net increase in household joblessness of 1.5 percentage 
points (the red diamond in Figure 15). The effect of increasing within-household polarisation is 
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substantially larger than the expected changes in household joblessness. 
 
We now turn to the regional level. Household joblessness remained almost stable in the Flemish 
region; in Brussels and Wallonia, household joblessness increased, respectively, by 7.8 and 2.4 
percentage points (see the red diamonds in Figure 15). Figure 15 shows that in Flanders and 
Wallonia, household joblessness rates should have fallen, given diminishing individual joblessness in 
both regions (light blue bars). This was counteracted by a demographic shift towards smaller 
households, which was however less prominent in Flanders than in the other regions (dark blue 
bars). In Wallonia, half of the impact of decreasing individual joblessness is counteracted by an 
increasing proportion of single-adult households. In Flanders, close to one quarter of the decline 
induced by the increase in the individual employment rate is offset by a decreasing household size. In 
Brussels, there was no substantial improvement in individual employment rates over the last 30 
years. Here, a quick shift towards smaller households exerted strong upward pressure on the 
expected change in household joblessness (about 3.5 percentage points). 
 
Finally, Figure 15 shows the impact of polarisation. In Flanders and Wallonia, the contribution of 
changes in polarisation is more important than the impact of the shift to smaller households. Most of 
the divergence between individual and household joblessness stems from an increasingly skewed 
distribution of employment over households. Changes in polarisation mainly occur within household 
size types, rather than between household sizes.  
 
 
9. Explaining polarisation: conditional randomization of individual risks 
 
Polarisation is the cardinal difference between the actual household joblessness and a counterfactual 
household joblessness, based on a random distribution of individual joblessness over households. 
This counterfactual household joblessness can be refined. Instead of using a random distribution of 
the individual joblessness of a country or region, one can take into account specific observable traits 
of individuals that are known to influence both household formation and labour market 
participation. This allows us to explore the impact of individual characteristics on polarisation. 
 
The concentration of joblessness in certain households may be due to the combination of two 
factors. First, individual characteristics influence the risk of individual joblessness. Lower education, 
older age or non-European origin, for example, all translate into a higher risk of individual 
joblessness. Second, it is possible that household members share common characteristics. In this 
case we speak of assortative mating or homogamy. If adults with similar characteristics live together, 
differences in individual risks will be amplified at the household level.  
 
In this section, we construct a variety of conditional counterfactual household joblessness rates. 
These conditional household joblessness rates allow individual joblessness risks to vary on the basis 
of: gender, age (three groups: 20-29, 30-49, 50-59), education11 (three groups: no primary education, 
at most secondary education, at least tertiary education) and region (Brussels, Flemish region, 
Walloon region). We predict conditional counterfactuals using one trait at a time and then predict 
counterfactuals based on the interaction of all four characteristics; conditional polarisation is the 
difference between these conditional counterfactuals and what we observe in reality. Figure 16 
displays indicators of conditional polarisation, for the whole population and for two household 
subgroups (singles and couples).   
 
                                                             
11
 Because information on the highest attained ISCED level of all respondents in EU-LFS is only gathered from 
1992 onwards, we confine the conditional analysis of polarisation to the period of 1992-2012.  
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[Figure 16 about here] 
 
The better the prediction of household joblessness by taking into account individual characteristics, 
the closer the conditional counterfactual will be to the observed reality, i.e. the lower the level of 
conditional polarisation. Hence, to assess the contribution of a specific characteristic to polarisation, 
one should compare the ‘unconditional polarisation’ level (the counterfactual household joblessness 
based on household size only) with various ‘conditional polarisation’ levels (see Gregg et al., 2012). 
The ‘explanatory power’ of a characteristic with regard to polarisation is the difference between 
unconditional polarisation and conditional polarisation (conditional on that characteristic), expressed 
as a proportion of the unconditional polarisation.  
 
When interpreting Figure 16, one should bear in mind that for singles the concept of polarisation is 
no more than the absolute difference between the individual joblessness rate for singles and the 
individual joblessness rate for the whole population. Therefore, changes in the explanatory power 
with regard to polarisation in this household subgroup are directly related to changing profiles of 
single adults. In couples, the extent to which individuals with similar characteristics tend to live 
together also plays a role in the evolutions shown in Figure 16.  
 
First, we allow for gender-specific joblessness rates. In 2012, gender-specific individual joblessness 
hardly offers any explanation for the level of polarisation: only 2 percent of polarisation is related to 
gender differences in individual joblessness. Indeed, when individual joblessness is rather similar for 
men and women, the conditional counterfactual household joblessness rate on the basis of gender 
equals the unconditional counterfactual, and no explanation for polarisation is found on the basis of 
this characteristic. Thirty years earlier, the difference in individual joblessness between men and 
women amounted to 38 percentage points. In 1983, polarisation was negative, with gender 
explaining more than 100 percent of this phenomenon. The fact that, by 2012, gender offers very 
little explanation for the (positive) polarisation of 2012, implies that gender (i.e. the convergence of 
individual risk profiles of men and women) contributes importantly to the explanation of changes in 
polarisation between 1983 and 2012.  
 
When we construct a counterfactual conditional on education (i.e. when we allow individual 
joblessness to vary on the basis of education), we observe a declining trend in the explanatory power 
of education with regard to polarisation. In 1993, around 30 percent of the total level of polarisation 
was related to educational differences. In 2012, those differences only account for 15 percent of 
total polarisation. Over this period of 20 years, no changes occurred in individual risk profiles of 
education subgroups. Individual joblessness rates of poorly educated adults freeze around 40 
percent, while those of adults educated at the tertiary level stay fixed at 11 percent. These stable 
individual employment rates over education mean that it is it likely that changes in the explanatory 
power of education are related to changes in assortative mating (among couples) or with changing 
profiles (among singles) over this characteristic. When we compare the explanatory power of 
education for polarisation among singles and couples, differences emerge over these household size 
subgroups. In single-adult households, conditioning on education increases the explanatory power of 
this characteristic over time (from around 3 percent to 20 percent). In couples, conditioning over 
education decreases the explanatory power over time (from almost 60 percent to 10 percent). 
Because no changes are observed in the individual joblessness risks over education groups, the 
changing explanatory power in single-adult households is related to an increasing share of higher risk 
profiles (i.e. lower educated singles). In 2012, adults living alone have a 7 percentage point higher 
probability of being low-skilled compared to the entire Belgian population. However, in 1993, the 
educational profile of singles was identical to that of an average adult. Keeping the educational 
profile of singles constant over time would have resulted in an 8 percent point lower household 
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joblessness level in 2012 than observed. In couples, one can observe that assortative mating has 
decreased12. Due to the global increase in average educational levels, the proportion of 
homogeneous non-educated couples declined and the proportion of ‘mixed educational’ couples 
increased. 
 
The region of residence is an observable trait of individuals which implies assortative mating by 
definition: members of a household always share their residence. Although this instance of 
assortative mating is by definition constant over time, its explanatory power for polarisation has 
increased from around 8 percent in 1993 to 13 percent in 2012. This small increase is driven by 
diverging individual joblessness over regional subgroups. In a cross-country comparison, 13 percent is 
rather high: in other European countries with similar levels of polarisation the explanatory power of 
region is less important than in Belgium. This is not only related to substantial differences in regional 
joblessness rates but also to the different demographic composition of the Belgian regions.  
 
Finally, we use the interaction of all traits together (gender, age, education and region) to estimate a 
conditional counterfactual household joblessness rate. Although the importance of these traits in 
explaining levels of polarisation separately is rather small (13 percent explained by region is not 
much per se, even if the percentage is higher than elsewhere) a substantial proportion of total 
polarisation in 2012 is explained by combining these characteristics. Around 33 percent of 
polarisation is due to variations of individual joblessness over gender, age, education and region. In 
single-adult households almost 40 percent of polarisation is explained through the combination of 
these characteristics. In couples around 25 percent is due to differences in individual joblessness risks 
and the sharing of common characteristics at the household level. However, there remains a 
substantial within-group component to the household joblessness rate that cannot be explained by 
these factors. This unexplained proportion is larger among couples. 
 
Between 1993 and 2012, conditional levels of polarisation rose by only 0.9 percentage points, while 
the unconditional level of polarisation increased by 2.2 points. Hence, the gap between the 
unconditional and the conditional indicators increases, which means that the explanatory power of 
the individual characteristics used to calculate the conditional polarisation increases (see our 
definition of ‘explanatory power’, supra). In yet other words, the unconditional polarisation which we 
calculate is increasingly driven by the individual characteristics of adults, both in single-adult 
households and couples. Over the last 20 years, the explanatory power of the interaction of age, 
gender, education and region rose from merely 3 percent to 30 percent. To understand the 
interaction effect, one should note that (rather stable) net individual joblessness risks on the basis of 
one characteristic can hide opposite trends. For example, young low-skilled individuals (20-29) are 
struggling with decreasing labour market opportunities (with individual employment rates of this 
                                                             
12 To quantify the impact of assortative mating (over education) on levels of polarisation in couples we 
compare observed and expected educational profiles of individuals living in couples. We define ‘expected 
educational profile’ as a random distribution of individual education levels in a country over couples. 
Assortative mating prevails over all educational levels. We observe much more homogeneous couples (with the 
same levels of education) than expected in a random distribution, independent of the level of education. In 
1992, assortative mating over educational levels was also prevalent. Over time however, the 
overrepresentation of couples with tertiary education increased, at the expense of the overrepresentation of 
poorly educated couples (5.4 percentage point change over time). In 2012, the proportion of adults with 
tertiary education living together in a couple is 14 percentage points higher than expected from a random 
distribution of educational profiles. In the same year, around 5.3 percent more individuals live in a couple with 
low education than expected from a random distribution. To estimate the effect of assortative mating on 
changes in household joblessness, we keep the 1992 levels of assortative mating fixed over time. Among 
couples, household joblessness in 2012 would be around 4 percentage points higher if no changes in 
assortative mating had occurred.  
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subgroup decreasing from 76 percent in 1992 to 58 percent in 2012), while older low-skilled 
individuals have seen an improvement in their labour market position (with employment rates of this 
increasing from 37 percent to 53 percent over the same period). Allowing individual joblessness rates 




10. Cross-country differences in household joblessness 
 
In this section we look at cross-country differences in the levels of household joblessness and 
polarisation. This comparative analysis in a European perspective is based on LFS 2012 data with 24 
European Union countries13. It is not straightforward to compare levels of household joblessness 
between countries and understand the differences. European countries differ significantly with 
regard to the underlying factors, such as the individual joblessness rates, household structures and 
levels of polarisation. In this section, we explore the reasons for the relatively high levels of 
polarisation in Belgium, compared to other European countries.  
 
While the bulk of all working age adults in Europe live in a couple (on average 56 percent in the 
EU24), we observe strong variation in the share of adults in smaller and larger households (Figure 
17). Countries with a weak welfare system, a late transition to adulthood and strong family ties (like 
Southern European countries and new Member States), show a relatively high proportion of 
households with more than two adults. In Romania, more than 38 percent of working adults live with 
at least three working age adults under the same roof, while only 10 percent of all adults live in a 
single-adult household. This incidence is significantly lower in other countries. In Germany the 
proportion of adults in a single-adult household (28.5 percent) is much higher than the share of 
adults in households with at least three adults (13 percent). 
 
[Figure 17 about here] 
 
Figure 18 compares individual and household measures of employment. With regard to individual 
joblessness, Belgium performs slightly better than the EU24 average (1.4 percentage points 
difference, on the basis of the data we use in Figure 17). However, when the country ranking is based 
on the share of individuals in jobless households, only four countries (Lithuania, Spain, Greece and 
Ireland) perform worse than Belgium. Countries with individual employment rates similar to Belgium 
succeed in keeping significantly larger proportions of working age adults out of household 
joblessness.  
 
[Figure 18 about here] 
 
Figure 18 suggests that the level of polarisation is high in Belgium. This is indeed the case, as shown 
in Figure 19, which presents overall polarisation and polarisation in household subgroups. Belgium, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria and Ireland display the highest level of polarisation, above 3.5 percentage points. 
In Malta, Italy and Luxemburg polarisation is negative. In all Southern-European welfare states, in 
some new Member States (Malta and Estonia) and in Luxemburg, negative polarisation rates are 
observed in the subgroup of couples. This negative polarisation among couples is consistent with 
theories on the gender division of non-employment and also occurred in Belgium during the 1980s. 
In single-adult households, polarisation of employment ranges from negative values in Southern 
European welfare states (-7 percentage points in Italy) to around 10 percentage points in the United 
                                                             
13
 Scandinavian countries are excluded from the analysis because no household information is available in the 
LFS data of those countries. 
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Kingdom, Belgium and Ireland. In households with at least three working age adults in Southern-
European countries, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ireland, one can observe high levels of polarisation.  
 
[Figure 19 about here] 
 
Figure 20 presents a decomposition of the differences in household joblessness between Belgium 
and all other EU23 countries. The results of this decomposition, for which Belgium serves as a 
benchmark, can be related to well-known clusters of welfare states, at least to some extent. Esping-
Andersen defined welfare state clusters initially on the basis of decommodification; later (1999: 72) 
he brought the family into play and defined clusters in terms of ‘the ways in which welfare 
production is allocated between state, market and households’. The average household size varies 
significantly among European countries. This is to a considerable extent due to the late (and still 
rising) age of exit of young adults from their parents’ home in Southern and most New Member 
States. Countries in the continental cluster (to which Belgium belongs) have similar household size 
structures. Thus, a certain correspondence exists between the geography of welfare regimes and the 
geography of average household size (Hank, 2007).  
 
Figure 20 shows that both differences in household size structures and differences in individual 
joblessness contribute substantially, ceteris paribus, to differences in household joblessness between 
countries. However, with Belgium as a benchmark, these contributory factors sometimes work in an 
opposite direction. Belgian individual employment rates are average in a European perspective, but 
significantly higher than in Southern European countries and most New Member States. Thus, 
differences in expected household joblessness (which is the result of individual joblessness and 
household size structures) between Belgium and those countries are mitigated. In addition, there is 
the impact of polarisation: figure 20 illustrates that polarisation in Belgium is higher than in all other 
countries, with the exception of Ireland and Bulgaria. Countries in Esping-Andersen’s ‘conservative’ 
cluster (AT, NL, DE, FR) have lower individual joblessness than Belgium, while household size 
structures are rather similar. But especially within-household polarisation is high in Belgium. In 
comparison with all other European countries (with the exception of Ireland and Bulgaria), Belgium 
scores much higher in within-household polarisation. Polarisation thus contributes to the 
comparatively poor performance of Belgium with regard to household joblessness.  
 
[Figure 20 about here] 
 
To better understand this high level of polarisation in Belgium, in the remainder of this section we 
confine the international comparison to six countries with more or less the same household structure 
but different levels of polarisation. We compare Belgium with Germany, France and the Netherlands, 
neighboring countries with relatively low levels of polarisation, and with Ireland and the UK, which 
have high levels of polarisation. We apply a logistic regression to examine underlying causal factors; 
this regression analysis complements an analysis on the concept of ‘conditional polarisation’, as it 
was already explained in section 9. Therefore, we return to ‘conditional polarisation’ at the end of 
this section. 
 
The regression aims to identify different factors explaining household joblessness; we thereby 
distinguish between singles and couples. With regard to singles, three factors are at play. First, it is 
possible that singles, irrespective of their gender, age, education, origin or the region where they 
live, run a higher risk of individual joblessness than people who do not live alone. Second, it is 
possible that the characteristics of singles in terms of gender, age, education, origin or the region 
where they live, make them more vulnerable to joblessness, irrespective of the fact that they are 
singles. Third, it is possible that the gap in individual joblessness between people with relatively 
strong and people with relatively weak individual profiles (in terms of gender, age, education, origin 
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and region), is larger in Belgium than in other countries; we can measure this gap by the variance in 
individual joblessness across subgroups defined by age, education, gender, origin and region. This 
third factor can also explain cross-country differences in household joblessness in couples, together 
with the degree of homogamy in couples. When adults with similar characteristics live together, a 
concentration of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ risks develops in households which leads, ceteris paribus, to higher 
household joblessness. If the variance in individual joblessness risks is the same, but in certain 
countries homogamy within couples is stronger, polarisation will again be larger in the latter 
countries. Hence, the degree of homogamy is the fourth factor which can explain differences in levels 
of polarisation.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We start the international comparison with a logistic regression to determine the probability of 
individual joblessness in the six countries under review (and the Belgian regions), after controlling for 
gender, age, education, origin and household size. In Table 1 we present the marginal effects for 
these explanatory variables. First, we find that when we control for gender, age, education and 
origin, the joblessness risk for singles is greater than for non-singles. This is the case in all countries, 
but the contribution of ‘being single’ (after controlling for other individual characteristics) to the 
joblessness risk is lowest in Germany and France. In Belgium, the probability of joblessness increases 
with 9 percentage points when one lives alone (after controlling for other individual characteristics), 
but this effect strongly differs between the regions. In the Netherlands, the marginal effect of being 
single on the joblessness risk is largest, with 10 percentage points. Even though the joblessness risk 
of singles differs between those six countries, it is not the driving force behind the comparatively 
high level of polarisation in Belgium. The second factor, the socio-demographic profile of singles, 
plays a much bigger role, notably in the comparison with Germany, France and the Netherlands.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows that in Belgium, more than in other countries, many singles have a ‘weak profile’, 
which increases their risk of joblessness: there is an overrepresentation of individuals with low skills, 
individuals of non-European origin and older persons, compared to the average Belgian population. 
There is a similar overrepresentation of low-skilled and older individuals among singles in Ireland and 
the UK; Ireland and the UK also have more women among the singles’ segment. In Germany, France 
and the Netherlands the profile of singles hardly differs from that of the total population.  
 
Thirdly, the logistic regression in Table 1 shows that the net impact of gender, age, education and 
origin, after controlling for the fact whether one lives alone or not, is much greater in Belgium than in 
Germany, France and the Netherlands, which are the low polarisation countries in the subset under 
review here. Table 3 presents data which corroborate this observation. 
 
[Table 3 about here]  
 
Table 3 indicates that the standard deviation14 in individual joblessness between young and older 
adults is nowhere as big as in Belgium (the spread is identical in Flanders and Wallonia). Belgium also 
leads in the spread of individual joblessness over origin; this gap is most prominent in Flanders. 
Additionally, with the exception of Ireland, in no other country are the differences in joblessness 
between the low-skilled and  high-skilled as big as in Belgium. Even if in Belgium and in other 
                                                             
14 Standard deviation is a measure for the spread, the degree to which values differ mutually, of a variable (or a 
distribution). Standard deviation is defined as the root from the variance. The variance measures the average 
of deviations of the different values to the average.  
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countries the profile of singles would be comparably weak and even if the degree of homogamy in 
couples would be identical, the much stronger variance in individual joblessness risks in Belgium, 
compared to those other countries, creates an upward pressure on polarisation.  
 
Finally, Table 4 presents data on the degree of educational homogamy15 in couples. There is no other 
country where the low-skilled cluster so strongly in couples as in Belgium. When we focus on the 
degree of homogamy of the high-skilled, Belgium scores in the same order of magnitude as Ireland 
and the UK and somewhat higher than France, the Netherland and Germany. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The previous analysis identifies different factors that contribute to a high level of polarisation in 
Belgium. As already explained in section 9, the concept of ‘conditional polarisation’ also allows to 
quantify the impact of these factors on the level of polarisation. Instead of using a random 
distribution of individual joblessness in a country or region, conditional polarisation takes the 
individual characteristics of persons into account. To understand the contribution of a certain 
characteristic on the level of polarisation, we must compare conditional polarisation with total 
polarisation. This can be done for each of the countries under review. In this way, we can compare 
the explanatory power of individual characteristics with regard to polarisation across countries.  
 
[Figure 21 about here] 
 
Figure 21 compares polarisation levels in Belgium, the Belgian regions, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and the UK. We show for each of these countries an index of unconditional 
polarisation, calculated on the basis of a random distribution of individual joblessness, in the left bar. 
We show conditional polarisation after correcting for gender, age, and education, in the second bar. 
For all countries, except for Germany16, we add conditional polarisation after controlling for gender, 
age, education and origin (third bar). For Belgium, Ireland and the UK we also look at conditional 
polarisation after correcting for gender, age, education and region (fourth bar). In the fifth bar, we 
show levels of conditional polarisation after controlling for gender, age, education, origin and region: 
this exercise is only possible for Belgium and the UK.  
 
In all the countries presented in Figure 21, polarisation is very high in the segment of singles. In the 
Netherlands, even 90 percent of polarisation occurs in this household segment. The fact that 
someone is single, controlled for gender, age, education, region and origin, leads to a higher risk of 
joblessness. In countries with relatively low polarisation, conditional polarisation based on a 
combination of individual characteristics seems to have only very weak explanatory power. In these 
countries the differences in individual joblessness risks between people with weak and strong 
profiles are rather limited. In the same countries, singles do not have a deviating profile compared to 
the rest of the population. Hence, the level of polarisation in Germany, France and the Netherlands 
can be explained exclusively by sociological differences in labour market participation between 
singles and individuals living in couples, irrespective of the characteristics of these individuals or their 
households. On the other hand, in countries with high polarisation (BE, UK and IE), polarisation 
decreases considerably when we control for gender, age and education. In these countries individual 
joblessness risks differ relatively strongly by individual characteristics for which we control, and in 
Belgium these differences seem to be strongest for gender and age. On the basis of these three 
                                                             
15 We divide the observed deviation of individuals’ educational levels with the expected distribution of 
educational levels within couples, on the basis of a random distribution of educational levels of men and 
women. The cardinal difference between observed and expected distribution we call homogamy (see Table 4).  
16 In the German LFS the variable ‘country of birth’ is not available.  
24 
 
characteristics we can explain 19 percent of polarisation in the segment of singles in Belgium. This 
explanatory power is also linked to the relatively greater share of low-skilled individuals in the 
singles’ segment. In Ireland and the UK we can explain respectively 36 and 22 percent of polarisation 
in the segment of singles. It is remarkable that the addition of origin or region to conditional 
polarisation does not increase the explanatory power in Ireland and the UK. In these countries, the 
spread in individual joblessness risks and weak profiles can be mainly explained by differences in 
educational levels. In Belgium, though, these differences increase when we add region and/or origin 
to conditional polarisation. In Belgium joblessness risks by individual characteristics differ much 
stronger between the regions and between different origin groups. Conditional polarisation by 
gender, age, education, origin and region explains 36 percent of total polarisation in Belgium.  
 
11. Polarisation, relative severity of work-poverty, and poverty 
 
Income poverty is typically measured on a household basis: the at-risk-of poverty indicator that is 
most often used counts the number of individuals living in a household that has a standardized net 
disposable household income below a poverty threshold. In all European welfare states there is an 
unambiguous and systematic negative correlation between at-risk-of-poverty rates of individuals and 
the work intensity of the household to which they belong (Vandenbroucke and Diris, 2014, pp. 16-17; 
European Commission, 2012, Chapter 2). ‘Household work intensity’ is a fine-grained indicator of 
household employment, which Eurostat defines as the ratio of the total number of months worked 
by working-age household members to the total number of months that they could, in theory, have 
worked17. For persons who reported having worked part-time, an estimate of the number of months 
in terms of full-time equivalents is computed on the basis of the number of hours habitually worked 
at the time of the interview. 
 
Hence, the work intensity of the household to which an individual belongs is a crucial factor in 
explaining his or her poverty risk. When the analysis shifts from the individual level to the level of 
welfare states and cross-country comparisons, it seems a logical presumption that national poverty 
rates correlate with household employment indicators rather than with individual employment 
indicators. In fact, the reality is more complex. Contrary to what one might expect, Corluy and 
Vandenbroucke (2014, 2015) show that, in a cross-country analysis, household joblessness correlates 
much less with non-elderly (or child) poverty rates than with individual joblessness. In contrast, pre-
transfer poverty correlates with both household joblessness and individual joblessness. Intuitively, 
one might understand this as follows: welfare states do compensate for high levels of household 
joblessness by means of social transfers; welfare states with high levels of individual employment 
seem more committed and/or more successful in doing so.  
 
Understanding the relationship between national poverty rates and household employment rates 
requires a more subtle analysis than simple bivariate correlation as well as a more fine-grained 
metric than ‘joblessness’ vs. ‘employment’. Vandenbroucke, Diris and Verbist (2013) distinguish 
three indicators of the household employment record of welfare states, on the basis of the Eurostat 
work intensity metric. The first indicator is the share of individuals in households with very low work 
intensity (less than 20%); these households are labeled as ‘very work-poor’. The second indicator is 
the share of individuals in households with medium work intensity or less (i.e. 55% or less); these 
households are labeled as ‘work-poor’. The third indicator is the share of individuals in very work-
poor households within the subgroup of individuals in work-poor households; this indicator is labeled 
‘the relative severity of work poverty’. Intuitively, the latter indicator seems to correspond to a 
                                                             
17
 When work intensities are calculated, all individuals in a specific age bracket (e.g. 20-59) are considered to be 
of ‘working age’, except students, who are excluded from the calculation. 
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notion of ‘polarisation of jobs over households’: when a welfare state is characterized by a 
comparatively high ‘relative severity of work poverty’ in its households, labour market participation 
seems distributed across households in a skewed way (in comparison with other welfare states). This 
is an observation, which, prima facie, signals a phenomenon of ‘polarisation’ of jobs over households.  
 
Vandenbroucke, Diris and Verbist (2013) examine different regression models explaining child 
poverty and non-elderly poverty in the second half of the 2000s on the basis of patterns of 
employment in European welfare states. They tested the explanatory power of individual 
employment rates, the share of individuals (either children or non-elderly individuals, depending on 
the poverty analysis at hand) in work-poor households, the share of individuals (idem) in very work-
poor households and the ‘relative severity of work poverty’ (together with the level and architecture 
of social spending). It turns out that combining the share of individuals in work-poor households and 
the ‘relative severity of work poverty’ as separate independent variables yields the best fit18. These 
results suggests that one should study the country-specific distribution of household work intensity 
over the population, and that the concentration of individuals in very work-poor households does 
play an independent role, next to the total share of individuals in work-poor households (see also 
Vandenbroucke and Diris, 2014). 
 
This research illustrates that the relationship between income poverty and household employment 
patterns is complex. However, it simultaneously shows that polarisation, as we define it, is indeed 
relevant to understanding welfare states’ performance with regard to poverty. For sure, the ‘relative 
severity of work poverty’ indicator applied in this research differs from the polarisation index 
calculated in this paper in two respects19. First, the underlying definitions of employment are 
different (a binary ILO-concept of employment/non-employment in the case of polarisation, versus 
the fine-grained Eurostat metric of household employment underpinning ‘relative severity of work 
poverty’). Second, the polarisation index is based on a contrast between observations and a 
counterfactual, whilst the ‘relative severity of work poverty’ is simply based on a ratio between 
observations. However, these indicators correlate with each other in an interesting way. Table 5 puts 
this into perspective, by presenting the correlation between eight different employment indicators 
for 28 European welfare states, all based on SILC 2011 and calculated for the working age population 
between 20 and 59 years old (excluding students): (1) the individual joblessness (i.e. the individual 
non-employment rate based on the ILO concept of employment); (2) the observed household 
joblessness; (3) the ratio of observed household joblessness to individual joblessness (i.e. the ratio of 
indicator 2 to indicator 1); (4) the counterfactual household joblessness underpinning the 
polarisation index; (5) the polarisation index; (6) the share of individuals in work-poor households; (7) 
the share of individuals in very work-poor households; and (8) the relative severity of work poverty 
(i.e. the ratio of indicator 7 to indicator 6).  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
                                                             
18 We should stress that this conclusion holds for the pooled time series regression over the whole period. It 
does not hold for a ‘naïve’ regression that is, for instance, limited to SILC 2011. In a simple regression applied to 
SILC 2011, with child poverty as dependent variable, and (i) the share of children in work-poor households, (ii) 
the relative severity of work poverty, and (iii) the share of transfers and pensions in household incomes of 
children as independent variables, it appears that only the share of children in work-poor households has a 
significant impact. In EU SILC 2011, the bivariate correlation coefficient with child poverty is 0.56 for the share 
of children in work-poor households, 0.24 for the share of children in very work-poor households, -0.15 for the 
relative severity of work poverty, and 0.01 for spending. The fact that 2010 was a year of deep crisis explains 
this result (in contrast to the result of a pooled time series regression over the whole period). 
19
 We also use a different database in the previous sections for the calculation of the polarisation index, namely 
LFS. In this section, we use the same database for comparing both concepts, namely SILC. 
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As shown in Table 5, individual joblessness (indicator 1) correlates strongly with the share of 
individuals in work-poor households (indicator 6), while household joblessness (indicator 2) 
correlates strongly with the share of individuals in very work-poor households (indicator 7). The 
latter observation is not so surprising, but the first observation – which establishes a rather close 
match between an individual employment indicator and a household employment indicator – needs 
more explanation than we can deliver here. However, the combination of these two observations 
explains why the two ratios which we construct on the basis of these data (our indicator 3, observed 
household joblessness on individual joblessness, which is the ratio of 2 to 1, and our indicator 8, the 
relative severity of work poverty, which is the ratio of 7 to 6) also correlate strongly with each other. 
In addition, both the relative severity of work poverty and the ratio of observed household 
joblessness to individual joblessness correlate strongly with our polarisation index. Figure 22 
visualizes this.  
 
[Figure 22 about here] 
 
In yet other words, it seems that our measure of polarisation is indeed relevant as a corollary of the 
relative severity of work poverty indicator, which is in turn a significant variable in the poverty 
analyses mentioned earlier20. The relative severity of work poverty is based on simple direct 
observations; polarisation introduces more analysis, since it is based on a deviation from a 
‘counterfactual’ and thus points to sociological, cultural and economic factors at work in labour 
markets and households. The correlation between the two indicators and their role in poverty 
analyses underscores the importance of further research on polarisation. 
 
Before concluding, we add a final thought on the link between our analysis and the abundant 
literature on ‘in-work poverty’, i.e. the prevalence of ‘working poor’ in contemporary welfare states. 
The notion of ‘work-poor households’ to which we refer in this section, must not be confused with 
the notion of ‘working poor’ or ‘in-work-poverty’. In the literature on ‘working poor’, an individual is 
considered to be ‘working poor’, when he/she is working but (financially) poor; thereby, ‘working’ is 
defined on a minimal basis (e.g. being in employment in the period just before the survey, even if the 
number of hours worked is very limited). Hence, the ‘working poor’ concept mixes observations at 
the level of the individual (is he/she employed or not employed?) with observations at the level of 
the household to which he/she belongs (what is the household income?). This makes it an 
intrinsically difficult concept, often leading to unwarranted conclusions. However, being considered 
‘working poor’ is not unrelated to the concept of work intensity: ‘working poor’ individuals often 
belong to households with low work intensity. In these cases, they are, individually, counted as 
‘working poor’ because of the limited work intensity of the household to which they belong; this may 
be the consequence of the fact that they work only irregularly or part-time, and/or of the very 
limited labour market participation of other household members (Marx and Nolan, 2014). So 
conceived, the line of research we pursue here -which explores household employment patterns- 
may also contribute to a better understanding of the popular but difficult concept of ‘working poor’. 
 
 
                                                             
20 Decomposition as we apply it in this paper with regard to polarization can also be applied to measures on the 
basis of household work intensity. For instance, Vandenbroucke and Vinck (2013, section 6) decompose the 
differences between Belgium and other countries with regard to the relative severity of work poverty (for 
households with children) into differences explained by the relative share of children living with lone parents, 
differences explained by the relative severity of work poverty within the group of lone parent households, and 
differences explained by the relative severity of work poverty in other households (and a fourth contributory 
factor). They find that differences in household size structure explain only a small portion of the differences in 
the relative severity of work poverty between Belgium and other countries. 
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12. Conclusions and questions for further research 
 
Individual-based and household-based measures of joblessness offer conflicting signals about labour 
market performance. In Belgium, individual joblessness fell continuously since the early 1980s while 
household joblessness remained fairly stable and even increased slightly. However, understanding 
the relationship between individual and household employment rates is far from evident. By 
exploring the Belgian data, this paper aims to shed light on some caveats, difficulties and possible 
pitfalls in our understanding of the relationship between patterns of individual and household 
employment.  
 
If we rank adults on the basis of the employment situation of their household, in 1983 the median 
adult belongs to a ‘mixed-employment household’; from 1991 onwards, the median adult belongs to 
a ‘full-employment household’. This evolution illustrates the rapid change from a male breadwinner 
model to a dual earner model. However, the spectacular increase in the share of individuals in ‘full-
employment households’, is, first of all, the mathematical corollary of the substantial rise in 
individual employment rates: it is what one would expect if (a growing number of) jobs would have 
been distributed randomly across Belgian households. The question is: to what extent can the 
discrepancy between household and individual employment not be explained by the mathematics of 
random distributions? This question underscores the relevance of the polarisation concept as 
defined by Gregg and Wadsworth (2008). This index is based on a counterfactual (or ‘expected’) 
household joblessness rate, i.e. the rate that would occur if jobs were randomly distributed in the 
population, given the specific household size structure in the country under examination. 
 
The ‘expected rate’ of household joblessness is a function of individual joblessness and household 
size structure. The combination of an improving individual employment rate and a narrowing average 
household size would have led to a drop in the expected household joblessness rate with 3.7 
percentage points. However, observed household joblessness has slightly increased in Belgium. In 
2012, the observed household joblessness is in every region higher than the expected household 
joblessness: the gap ranges from 2.5 and 2.7 percentage points in Flanders and Brussels respectively 
to 4.4 percentage points in Wallonia. However, when we look at trends over time, the evolution of 
this gap is strongest in Flanders, where it increased by 5.2 percentage points. Changes over time in 
Wallonia are also substantial, with a 4.7 percentage point change over 30 years. The growth in 
polarisation is more limited in Brussels, with a 3.0 percentage point increase. 
 
Polarisation of jobs can be decomposed on the basis of household size subgroups. Polarisation is 
much higher in single-adult households than in other households. (Brussels constitutes an exception 
in this respect, with limited polarisation in single-adult households and larger polarisation in 
households with at least three working-age adults). A decomposition of the overall level of 
polarisation in 2012 leads to the following result: 62 percent of overall polarisation in Belgium is due 
to the weighted contribution (weighted by household size) of polarisation in single-adult households; 
the weighted contribution of polarisation in two-adult households is only 31 percent. Also here, 
regional diversity prevails. In Flanders, almost half of polarisation is due to the weighted contribution 
of polarisation in couples. In Wallonia, on the contrary, 81 percent of total polarisation is a result of 
the weighted contribution of polarisation in single-adult households.  
 
Hence, the standstill in household joblessness is the combined effect of what could be expected on 
the basis of changes in individual employment, shifts in household size structure, and an increase in 
polarisation. The increasing polarisation itself can be decomposed into the contribution by ‘change 
within households’ as well as the contribution by ‘change between’. The total expected decrease in 
household joblessness of 3.7 percentage points is undone by increasing within-household 
polarisation. In both single adult households and couples we observe growing levels of polarisation. 
Within these household groups, changes in polarisation are similar, but at the country level, the 
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weighted contribution of changes in polarisation in couples is most important. This is another way of 
saying that the male breadwinner model faded away. The contribution of changes among couples to 
total polarisation was most important in Flanders. In the Walloon region, both the absolute and 
weighted contribution of changes in polarisation in single adult households is much bigger than in 
the other regions.   
 
The notion of expected household joblessness can be refined by taking into account observable traits 
of individuals that influence both household formation and labour market participation, such as 
gender, age, education and the region where they live. These observable traits are used to calculate 
‘conditional expected household joblessness’ and ‘conditional polarisation’; this allows to measure 
the impact of individual characteristics on polarisation.  
Conditioning by gender, age, education, origin and/or region shows the impact of specific individual 
risk profiles (among singles and couples) and assortative mating (among couples) on the overall level 
of polarisation. Changes in the explanatory power of individual traits for polarisation are related to 
(a) changing risks in individual joblessness, (b) changing profiles of single-adults or (c) changing levels 
of assortative mating. In 2012, around 15 percent of polarisation is explained by individual 
differences in education and region. Gender explains merely 2 percent of the level of polarisation. 
However, this analysis highlights that gender is the main driver of the evolution of polarisation, 
because of the increasing feminisation of the labour market. In 1992, conditional polarisation by 
gender was higher than unconditional polarisation (i.e. expected household joblessness was lower in 
1992, when we differentiate joblessness risk on the basis of gender). By 2012, conditional 
polarisation by gender equals unconditional polarisation (i.e. the ‘conditional expected’ – by gender – 
and the unconditional expected household joblessness are more or less the same). Feminisation of 
employment rather than more assortative mating (more ‘homogamy’) explains the trend. The strong 
explanatory power of gender for the evolution of polarisation also translates into an increasing 
explanatory power, for the level of polarisation, of the interaction of age, gender, education and 
region, from only 3 percent in 1993 to 30 percent in 2012. 
 
What we label ‘polarisation’ in this analysis is driven, in part, by the well-known fact that singles and 
lone parents are typically less employed than other adults. The explanatory power of individual traits 
for levels of polarisation is stronger in single-adult households than in couples. The reason is that 
individual risk profiles of singles differ more strongly from the average characteristics of the Belgian 
population than the individual risk profiles of people living together. However, when we focus on the 
evolution over time, the weighted contribution (weighted by household size) of the increasing 
polarisation in couples is most important.  
 
The decomposition of overall polarisation levels in 2012, shows that the weighted contribution of 
polarisation in single-adult households in Western-European countries ranges from very low in new 
European member states (for example 11 percent in Slovakia) to 48 percent in the UK and Austria 
and 90 percent in the Netherlands. In Southern Europe, polarisation in three-adult households exerts 
an upward pressure on total levels, but this is counteracted by negative levels of polarisation among 
single adults and couples. The net contribution of polarisation in two-adult households varies 
between European countries; but it is never higher than 50 percent, despite the fact that couples 
remain the dominant household type throughout Europe. 
 
Comparing Belgium with other countries having a similar household structure (DE, FR, NL, IE en VK), 
yields the following observations. Individual employment in Belgium is relatively low, compared to 
those countries. We can therefore expect that Belgium also has a relatively high household 
joblessness level, even with a ‘random’ distribution of the available jobs over households. In reality, 
the distribution of jobs over households is not a ‘random’ distribution. It turns out that singles in the  
countries under review are more often jobless than people who share a household with others. By 
definition, unemployed singles constitute a jobless household; in itself, this explains why household 
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joblessness is frequent in singles. However, in Belgium, the concentration of household joblessness in 
the segment of singles is exacerbated by two factors. First, compared to the total population, Belgian 
singles are more often low-skilled, born outside of the European Union, and older. Second, the 
difference in joblessness risks between individuals with ‘strong profiles’ and individuals with ‘weak 
profiles’ is large in Belgium (both for singles and individuals in other households). In no other country 
is the difference between the joblessness risk of a young and an older adult or between a person 
born in the host country and a non-European immigrant as large as in Belgium. Moreover, these 
differences are enhanced by the regional factor. In no other country is the gap between the 
unemployment risk of a low-skilled individual in one part of the country and the unemployment risk 
of a  high-skilled individual in the other part of the country as large as in Belgium.  
 
Today’s high level of household joblessness in Belgium is mainly due to the relatively bad position of 
singles, which is associated with the variance in individual joblessness risks. But the variance in 
individual risks is amplified in the segment of couples, because Belgian couples are relatively 
homogeneous with regard to the education of the individuals that constitute them. To illustrate this, 
we calculate the gap between the actual share of low-skilled people living together as a couple and 
the share one would expect on the basis of a random distribution of individual education levels in 
couples: this gap is more important in Belgium than in the other five countries under review. When 
we look at homogamy of the  high-skilled, however, Belgium is not an outlier, but it is higher than in 
Germany, France and the Netherlands.  
 
Using the qualification ‘insiders’ for persons with relatively lower joblessness risks than the average 
and the qualification ‘outsiders’ for persons with relatively higher joblessness risks, we may 
summarize our analysis as follows. Three factors seem to contribute to polarisation, as we see it in 
Belgium: an overrepresentation of ‘insiders’ in singles; homogamy of ‘insiders’, resp. ‘outsiders’ in 
couples; a large gap in joblessness risks between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.   
 
In further work, it is necessary to explore the underlying demographic, economic, sociological and 
cultural factors in polarisation, in Belgium and elsewhere. 
  
First, with regard to labour market participation, the incentives created by tax, benefit and early exit 
systems might depend on household circumstances. It is, in theory, conceivable that a tax and 
benefit system stimulates couples to be either both in employment, or both out of employment. 
Whether that is the case in countries with high levels of polarisation in the couple subgroup (and, if 
so, whether it is linked to types of means testing, as in the UK, or household-based social security 
entitlements, as in Belgium) is an important question for further research. 
 
Second, it may be the case that employment risk pooling in households is affected by the type of jobs 
that household members are able to find as well as by ‘assortative mating’ with regard to the types 
of jobs (rather than by assortative mating with regard to personal features). Further research should 
explore the potential links between the polarisation of jobs over households and existing research on 
the changing nature of jobs, such as by Goos et al. (2009) and Autor et al. (2006). An example of a 
paper linking polarisation of jobs over households to the nature of jobs is Ward and Ozdemir (2013). 
 
Finally, specific trends on the labour market, such as the increasing prevalence of part-time work, call 
for a more fine-grained concept of employment, both at the individual and household level. The ILO 
employment concept is limited to a binary status of being in or out of employment. Polarisation 
should also be analysed over continuous measures of expected and actual household work intensity. 
This would allow for an analysis of the impact of precarious and part-time employment, which opens 
up opportunities for a better understanding of in-work poverty. 
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Figure 1: Individual and (expected and observed) household (non-)employment rates, 1983-2012, 
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Figure 2: Individual and (expected and observed) household joblessness rates, 1983-2012, by region; LFS  
 
(panel a) Brussels     (panel b) Flemish region     (panel c) Walloon region 













































Figure 3: Household joblessness rates by household size, 1983-2012, by region; LFS 
 
(panel a) Brussels     (panel b) Flemish region     (panel c) Walloon region 
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Figure 5: Household size structure, 1983-2012, by region; LFS 
 
(panel a) Brussels     (panel b) Flemish region     (panel c) Walloon region 
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Figure 6: Evolution of household joblessness, Belgium, by age and region, 1983 – 2012; LFS 
 
(panel a) Brussels     (panel b) Flemish region     (panel c) Walloon region 
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Figure 7: Age distribution of adults in jobless households, 1983-2012, by region; LFS 
 
(panel a) Brussels                             (panel b) Flemish region     (panel c) Walloon region 
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Figure 8: Share of adults with at least one child in the household, as a percentage of all adults living in jobless households, 1983-2012, by region; LFS 
 
(panel a) Brussels     (panel b) Flemish region     (panel c) Walloon region 




































Figure 9: Education level of adults in jobless households, 1992-2012, by region: LFS 
 
(panel a) Brussels     (panel b) Flemish region     (panel c) Walloon region 
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Figure 10: Country of birth of adults in jobless households, 1995-2012, by region; LFS 
 
(panel a) Brussels     (panel b) Flemish region     (panel c) Walloon region 
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Figure 12: Levels of polarisation by household size, by region, 1983-2012; LFS 
 
(panel a) Brussels      (panel b) Flemish region     (panel c) Walloon region 
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Figure 14: Levels of polarisation with weighted contribution by household size, 1983-2012, by region; LFS 
 
(panel a) Brussels      (panel b) Flemish region     (panel c) Walloon region 
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Figure 16: Levels of polarisation, unconditional and conditional, by household size, Belgium, 1993-
(1992-)2012; LFS 
 












1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
P single unconditional P couple unconditional
P all unconditional P single conditional









1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
P single unconditional P couple unconditional
P all unconditional P single conditional
P couple conditional P all conditional
46 
 











1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
P single unconditional P couple unconditional
P all unconditional P single conditional









1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
P single unconditional P couple unconditional
P all unconditional P single conditional
P couple conditional P all conditional
47 
 








































1 wa adult hh 2 wa adult hh at least 3 wa adult hh
48 
 








































household joblessness individual joblessness
49 
 












t it lu gr cz ee p
t p
l


















all 1 wa adult hh 2 wa adult hh at least 3 wa adult hh
50 
 
Figure 20: Decomposition of the difference in household joblessness between Belgium and other EU24 countries, 2012; LFS 
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Table 1: Marginal effects on the probability of individual joblessness (after probit estimations), 
Belgium and Belgian regions, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK, 2012 
(reference variable between brackets); LFS 
  
 BRU FLA WAL BE DE FR NL IE UK 
male (women) -0.13 -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.11 -0.09 
age 20-29 (age 30-49) 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.04 
age 50-59 (age 30-49) -0.01 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 
low-skilled (medium 
skilled) 
0.11 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.15 
high-skilled (medium 
skilled) 
-0.15 -0.07 -0.17 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 -0.17 -0.08 
origin EU-25 (born in the 
country) 
0.02 0.06 0.01 0.06 
 
0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 
origin non-EU-25 (born in 
the country) 
0.18 0.20 0.16 0.19 
 
0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 
single (hh ≥ 3 adults) 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.08 




Table 2: Socio-economic profile of singles, relative to the total working age population, for Belgium 
and Belgian regions, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, UK, 2012; LFS 
  
 BRU FLA WAL BE DE FR NL IE UK 
man 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.96 1.04 0.94 0.99 0.74 0.84 
woman 1.01 1.05 1.06 1.05 0.96 1.06 1.01 1.25 1.16 
          
20-29 0.87 0.77 0.81 0.82 1.20 1.00 1.10 0.74 0.81 
30-49 1.01 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.98 0.98 
50-59 1.09 1.18 1.20 1.15 1.00 1.21 1.17 1.30 1.24 
          
low-skilled 1.06 1.17 1.25 1.21 1.03 1.06 1.00 1.42 1.16 
medium-skilled 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.92 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.92 1.02 
high-skilled 1.00 0.94 0.87 0.94 0.98 0.97 1.01 0.86 0.89 
          
native 1.01 0.98 0.97 0.94  1.01 0.98 1.04 1.02 
EU25 0.96 1.25 1.02 1.22  0.80 1.08 0.90 1.00 






Table 3: Standard deviation of individual joblessness across population subgroups; Belgium and 
Belgian regions, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Ireland and UK, 2012; LFS 
 
 BRUS VLA WAL BE DE FR NL IE VK 
man 27.6 13.2 21.9 17.5 12.0 15.1 11.2 26.3 15.6 
woman 39.1 22.0 33.2 27.5 21.1 24.8 20.8 35.2 25.5 
standard deviation 8.1 6.3 8.0 7.1 6.5 6.9 6.8 6.3 7.0 
          
20-29 33.7 14.7 25.5 20.5 16.4 22.2 12.3 31.0 21.2 
30-49 32.9 13.3 23.0 18.6 14.9 16.9 14.9 28.6 18.8 
50-59 33.9 27.7 37.7 31.4 19.6 24.9 21.1 36.9 23.6 
standard deviation 0.5 7.9 7.9 6.9 2.4 4.1 4.5 4.3 2.4 
          
low-skilled 52.2 35.4 48.9 42.4 34.2 33.5 29.8 52.6 38.6 
medium-skilled 35.3 15.2 25.3 19.9 15.9 19.2 13.6 32.7 18.5 
high-skilled 19.6 8.9 11.2 11.0 8.4 11.5 9.1 17.3 12.6 
standard deviation 16.3 13.8 19.0 16.2 13.3 11.1 10.9 17.7 13.6 
          
native 23.9 14.6 24.9 18.5  18.0 13.5 30.1 19.0 
EU25 26.6 23.1 30.6 26.6  23.8 19.3 31.9 19.7 
non-EU25 49.9 44.5 48.2 47.2  37.1 34.0 36.7 29.8 






Table 4: Educational homogamy in Belgium and Belgian regions, Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Ireland and United Kingdom, 2012; LFS 
  
 BRU FLA WAL BE DE FR NL IE UK 
low-skilled 6.6 4.7 6.5 5.4 4.0 4.4 3.1 4.8 2.3 
medium-skilled  2.1 4.7 4.7 4.8 6.1 5.1 2.9 4.6 3.9 
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GAE: conditional polarisation over gender, age and education, for all countries and regions 
GAEO: conditional polarisation over gender, age, education and origin, for all countries and regions, except for Germany 
GAER: conditional polarisation over gender, age, education and region, for BE, UK and IE 
GAEOR: conditional polarisation over gender, age, education, origin and region, for Belgium and the UK   
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Figure 22: Cross-country comparison of three employment indicators: ratio of individual joblessness 
to household joblessness (ILO-definition); polarisation; relative severity of work poverty (based on 




Table 5: Correlation matrix of employment indicators, 2011; SILC 
 





















































































































































1 individual joblessness 1.00 
      
  
2 observed household joblessness 0.50 1.00 
     
  
3 observed hh jl/individual jl ( = 2/1) -0.42 0.57 1.00 
    
  
4 counterfactual hhousehold joblessness 0.78 0.83 0.15 1.00 
   
  
5 polarisation (= 3-4) -0.38 0.44 0.78 -0.13 1.00 
  
  
6 share of individuals in work-poor hh 0.92 0.43 -0.40 0.76 -0.47 1.00 
 
  
7 share of individuals in very work-poor hh 0.49 0.91 0.47 0.76 0.39 0.53 1.00   
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